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Abstract. We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilis-
tic information-theoretic security to mitigate one of quantum key dis-
tribution’s major limitations: the short maximum transmission distance
(∼ 200 km) possible with present day technology. Our scheme uses clas-
sical secret sharing techniques to allow secure transmission over long
distances through a network containing randomly-distributed compro-
mised nodes. The protocol provides arbitrarily high confidence in the
security of the protocol, and modest scaling of resource costs with im-
provement of the security parameter. Although some types of failure are
undetectable, users can take preemptive measures to make the probabil-
ity of such failures arbitrarily small.
Keywords: quantum key distribution; QKD; secret sharing; information
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1 Introduction
Public key cryptography is a critical component of many widely-used
cryptosystems, and forms the basis for much of our ecommerce transac-
tion security infrastructure. Unfortunately, the most common public key
schemes are known to be insecure against quantum computers. In 1994,
Peter Shor developed a quantum algorithm for efficient factorization and
discrete logarithms [1]; the (supposed) hardness of these two problems
formed the basis for RSA and DSA, respectively. Sufficiently powerful
quantum computers do not yet exist, but the possibility of their existence
in the future already poses problems for those with significant forward
security requirements.
A more secure replacement for public key cryptography is needed.
Ideally, this replacement would offer information-theoretic security, and
would possess most or all of the favorable qualities of public key cryp-
tography. At present, no complete replacement exists, but quantum key
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distribution (QKD)—in conjunction with one-time pad (OTP) or other
symmetric ciphers—appears promising.
QKD—first developed by Bennett and Brassard [2]—is a key distri-
bution scheme that relies upon the uncertainty principle of quantum me-
chanics to guarantee that any eavesdropping attempts will be detected. In
a typical QKD setup, individual photons are sent through optical fiber or
through free space from the sender to the receiver. The receiver performs
measurements on the photons, and sender and receiver communicate via
an authenticated (but not necessarily private) classical channel.
Optical attenuation of these single photon pulses limits the maxi-
mum transmission distance for a single QKD link to about 200 km over
fiber with present technology [3], and significantly less through air. Un-
like optically-encoded classical information, the “signal strength” of these
photons cannot be amplified using a conventional optical amplifier; the
No Cloning Theorem [4] prohibits this. We refer to this challenge as the
relay problem.
Two classes of quantum repeaters have been proposed to resolve the
distance limitations of QKD. The first makes use of quantum error cor-
rection to detect and rectify errors in specially-encoded pulses. Unfortu-
nately, the extremely low error thresholds for such schemes (∼ 10−4) make
this impractical for use in a realistic quantum repeater. The second class
of quantum repeaters uses entanglement swapping and distillation [5, 6]
to establish entanglement between the endpoints of a chain of quantum
repeaters, which can then be used for QKD [7]. This method is much more
tolerant of errors, and offers resource costs that scale only polynomially
with the number of repeaters (i.e., polynomially with distance). How-
ever, such repeaters do have one major drawback: they require quantum
memories with long decoherence times [6].
In order to be useful for practical operation, a quantum repeater must
possess a quantum memory that meets the following three requirements:
1. Long coherence times: at a minimum, coherence times must be compa-
rable to the transit distance for the entire repeater chain (e.g., ∼ 10 ms
for a trans-Atlantic link).
2. High storage density: the bandwidth for a quantum repeater is limited
by the ratio of its quantum memory capacity to the transit time for
the entire repeater chain [8].
3. Robustness in extreme environments: practical quantum repeaters
must be able to operate in the range of environments to which tele-
com equipment is exposed (e.g., on the ocean floor, in the case of a
trans-oceanic link).
These requirements are so demanding that it is possible that practical
quantum repeaters will not be widely available until after large-scale
quantum computers have been built—in other words, not until too late.
The distance limitations of QKD and the issues involved in devel-
oping practical quantum repeaters make it challenging to build secure
QKD networks that span a large geographic area. The na¨ıve solution of
classical repeaters leads to exponentially decaying security with transmis-
sion distance if each repeater has some independent probability of being
compromised. If large QKD networks are to be built in the near future
(i.e., without quantum repeaters), an alternative method of addressing
the single-hop distance limitation must be found. We refer to this as the
relay problem.
Given an adversary that controls a randomly-determined subset of
nodes in the network, we have developed a solution to the relay prob-
lem that involves encoding encryption keys into multiple pieces using a
secret sharing protocol [9, 10]. These shares are transmitted via multi-
ple multi-hop paths through a QKD network, from origin to destination.
Through the use of a distributed re-randomization protocol at each inter-
mediate stage, privacy is maintained even if the attacker controls a large,
randomly-selected subset of all the nodes.
We note that authenticated QKD is information-theoretic secure [11],
as is OTP; in combination, these two cryptographic primitives provide
information-theoretic security on the level of an individual link. Our pro-
tocol makes use of many such links as part of a network that provides
information-theoretic security with very high probability. In particular,
with some very small probability δ, the protocol fails in such a way as
to allow a sufficiently powerful adversary to perform undetected man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The failure probability δ can be made
arbitrarily small by modest increases in resource usage. In all other cases,
the network is secure. We describe the level of security of our protocol as
probabilistic information-theoretic.
In analyzing our protocol, we consider a network composed of a chain
of “cities”, where each city contains several parties, all of whom are linked
to all the other parties in that city. We assume intracity bandwidth is
cheap, whereas intercity bandwidth is expensive; intercity bandwidth us-
age is the main resource considered in our scaling analysis. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider communication between two parties (Alice and
Bob) who are assumed to be at either end of the chain of cities. A similar
analysis would apply to communication between parties at any interme-
diate points in the network.
2 Adversary and Network Model
It is convenient to model networks with properties similar to those de-
scribed above by using undirected graphs, where each vertex represents
a node or party participating in the network, and each edge represents a
secure authenticated private channel. Such a channel could be generated
by using QKD in conjunction with a shared secret key for authentication,
or by any other means providing information-theoretic security.
We describe below an adversary and network model similar in some
ways to one we proposed earlier3 in the context of a protocol for authenti-
cating mutual strangers in a very large QKD network, which we referred
to as the stranger authentication protocol. In that protocol, edges rep-
resented shared secret keys, whereas here they represent physical QKD
links. Network structure in the previous model was assumed to be random
(possibly with a power law distribution, as is common in social networks),
whereas here the network has a specific topology dictated by geographic
constraints, the distance limitations of QKD, and the requirements of the
protocol.
2.1 Adversarial Capabilities and Limitations
We call the following adversary model the sneaky supercomputer :
(i) The adversary is computationally unbounded.
(ii) The adversary can listen to, intercept, and alter any message on any
public channel.
(iii) The adversary can compromise a randomly-selected subset of the
nodes in the network. Compromised nodes are assumed to be under
the complete control of the adversary. The total fraction of compro-
mised nodes is limited to (1− t) or less.
Such an adversary is very powerful, and can successfully perform
MITM attacks against public key cryptosystems (using the first capa-
bility) and against unauthenticated QKD (using the second capability),
but not against a QKD link between two uncompromised nodes that
share a secret key for authentication (since quantum mechanics allows
the eavesdropping to be detected) [11]. The adversary can always per-
form denial-of-service (DOS) attacks by simply destroying all transmitted
information; since DOS attacks cannot be prevented in this adversarial
3 Pre-print available at www.arXiv.org as arXiv:0803.2717
scenario, we concern ourselves primarily with security against MITM at-
tacks. Later, we will briefly consider variants of this adversarial model
and limited DOS attacks.
The third capability in this adversarial model—the adversary’s control
of a random subset of nodes—simulates a network in which exploitable
vulnerabilities are present on some nodes but not others. As a first ap-
proximation to modeling a real-world network, it is reasonable to assume
the vulnerable nodes are randomly distributed throughout the network.
An essentially equivalent adversarial model is achieved if we replace
the third capability as follows: suppose the adversary can attempt to
compromise any node, but a compromise attempt succeeds only with
probability (1−t), and the adversary can make no more than one attempt
per node. In the worst case where the adversary attempts to compromise
all nodes, the adversary will control a random subset of all nodes, with
the fraction of compromised nodes being roughly (1− t).
2.2 The Network
For the relay problem, let us represent the network as a graphG, with V (G)
being the set of vertices (nodes participating in the network) and E(G)
being the set of edges (secure authenticated channels, e.g. QKD links be-
tween parties who share secret keys for authentication). N = |V (G)| is
the number of vertices (nodes). Vd is the set of compromised nodes, which
are assumed to be under the adversary’s control; |Vd| ≤ N(1−t). Further-
more, let us assume that the network has the following structure: nodes
are grouped into m clusters—completely connected sub-graphs contain-
ing n nodes each. There are thus N = mn nodes in the network. We label
the nodes as vi,j , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Each node is connected
to one node in the immediately preceding cluster and one node in the
cluster immediately following it.
More formally, let E`(G) ≡ {(vi,j , vi,j+1) : vi,j , vi,j+1 ∈ V (G)} and
Eσ(G) ≡ {(vi,j , vk,j) : vi,j , vk,j ∈ V (G)}. Then, E(G) ≡ E`(G) ∪ Eσ(G).
This network structure models a chain ofm cities (a term which we use
interchangeably with “cluster”), each containing n nodes. The cities are
spaced such that the physical distance between cities allows QKD links
only between adjacent cities. To realistically model the costs of commu-
nication bandwidth, we assume that use of long distance links (i.e., those
represented by E`(G)) is expensive, whereas intracity links (i.e., Eσ(G))
are cheap.
Next, we consider two additional nodes—a sender and a receiver. The
sender (hereafter referred to as Alice or simply A) has direct links to all
the nodes in city 1, while the receiver (Bob, or B) has a link to all nodes
in city m. We assume Alice and Bob to be uncompromised. An example
is shown in Fig. 1.
3 The Relay Protocol
In the relay problem, Alice wishes to communicate with Bob over a dis-
tance longer than that possible with a single QKD link, with quantum
repeaters being unavailable. As described above, Alice and Bob are sep-
arated by m “cities”, each containing n participating nodes. (In the case
where different cities contain different numbers of participating nodes, we
obtain a lower bound on security by taking n to be the minimum over all
cities.)
Alice Bob
Fig. 1. White vertices represent honest parties, whereas shaded vertices represent dis-
honest parties. Double vertical lines represent secure communication links between all
joined vertices (i.e., all parties within a given city can communicate securely). In the
graph shown above, 40% of the parties in cities between Alice and Bob are dishonest,
but Alice and Bob can still communicate securely using the method described in Sec.
3 and Fig. 2.
To achieve both good security and low intercity bandwidth usage, we
can employ a basic secret sharing scheme with a distributed re-randomization
of the shares [12] performed by the parties in each city. This re-randomization
procedure is similar to that used in the mobile adversary proactive secret
sharing scheme [13, 14]. Note that in the following protocol description,
the second subscript labels the city, while the first subscript refers to the
particular party within a city.
(i) Alice generates n random strings ri,0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of length `,
r ∈ {0, 1}`. ` is chosen as described in Sec. 3.1.
(ii) Alice transmits the strings to the corresponding parties in the first
city: vi,1 receives ri,0.
(iii) When a party vi,j receives a string ri,j−1, it generates n− 1 random
strings q(k)i,j , k 6= i of length `, and transmits each string q(k)i,j to party
vk,j (i.e., transmission along the vertical double lines shown in Fig.
1).
(iv) Each party vi,j generates a string ri,j as follows:
ri,j ≡ ri,j−1 ⊕
⊕
k,k 6=i
q
(k)
i,j
⊕
⊕
k,k 6=i
q
(i)
k,j
 ,
where the symbols (⊕ and ⊕) are both understood to mean bitwise
XOR. Note that the string ri,j−1 is received from a party in the
previous city, the strings q(k)i,j are generated by the party vi,j , and
the strings q(i)k,j are generated by other parties in the same city as vi,j .
The string ri,j is then transmitted to party vi,j+1 (i.e., transmission
along the horizontal lines shown in Fig. 1).
(v) Steps (iii) and (iv) are repeated until the strings reach the parties
in city m. All the parties vi,m in city m forward the strings they
receive to Bob.
(vi) Alice constructs s ≡ ∏i ri,0 and Bob constructs s′ ≡ ∏i ri,j−1.
(vii) Alice and Bob use the protocol summarized in Fig. 2 and described
in detail in Section 3.1 to determine if s = s′. If so, they are left with
a portion of s (identified as s3), which is their shared secret key. If
s 6= s′, Alice and Bob discard s and s′ and repeat the protocol.
3.1 Key Verification
In the last step of the protocol described above, Alice and Bob must
verify that their respective keys, s and s′, are the same and have not
been tampered with. We note that there are many ways4 to accomplish
this; we present one possible method here (summarized in Fig. 2) for
definiteness, but make no claims as to its efficiency.
We consider Alice’s key s to be composed of three substrings, s1, s2,
and s3, with lengths `1, `2, and `3, respectively (typically, `3  `1, `2).
Bob’s key s′ is similarly divided into s′1, s′2, and s′3. If Alice and Bob
4 See for example pp. 13–14 of the SECOQC technical report D-SEC-48, by L. Salvail
[15].
(r, H(s3)) ! s1
H(r) ! s2’
Fig. 2. Alice and Bob perform a verification sub-protocol to check that their respective
secret keys, s = (s1, s2, s3) and s
′ = (s′1, s
′
2, s
′
3), are in fact the same. Alice generates
a random number r, concatenates it with the hash H[s3] of s3, XORs this with s1,
and sends the result to Bob. Bob decodes with s′1, verifies that H[s3] = H[s
′
3], then
sends back to Alice the result of bit-wise XORing the hash of r, H[r], with s′2. Finally,
Alice decodes with s2 and checks to see that the value Bob has computed for H[r] is
correct. Alice and Bob now know s3 = s
′
3 and can store s3 for future use. Note that
with this protocol, the adversary can fool Alice and Bob into accepting s 6= s′ with 100
% probability if the adversary knows s and s′.
successfully verify that s′3 = s3, they can use s3 as a shared secret key for
OTP encryption or other cryptographic purposes.
The verification is accomplished as follows:
(i) Alice generates a random nonce r, and computes the hash H[s3] of
s3. She then sends (r,H[s3])⊕ s1 to Bob.
(ii) Bob receives the message from Alice, decrypts by XORing with s′1,
and verifies that the received value of H[s3] matches H[s′3]. If so, he
accepts the key, and sends Alice the message H[r]⊕ s′2. If not, Bob
aborts.
(iii) Alice decrypts Bob’s message by XORing with s2, and verifies that
the received value of H[r] is correct. If so, Alice accepts the key, and
verification is successful. If not, Alice aborts.
We now outline a proof of the security of this verification process, and
discuss requirements for the hash function H. We begin with the assump-
tion that Eve does not know s or s′; if she does, the relay protocol has
failed, and Eve can perform MITM attacks without detection (conditions
under which the relay protocol can fail are analyzed in Sec. 4). Our goal
is to show that Alice and Bob will with very high probability detect any
attempt by Eve to introduce errors in s′3 (i.e., any attempt by Eve to
cause s′3 6= s3), and that the verification process will also not reveal any
information about s3 to Eve.
We note that any modification by Eve of the messages exchanged
by Alice and Bob during the verification process is equivalent to Eve
introducing errors in s′1 and s′2 during the main part of the relay protocol.
If she controls at least one intermediate node, Eve can introduce such
errors by modifying one or more of the strings transmitted by a node
under her control. We can thus completely describe Eve’s attack on the
protocol by a string e = (e1, e2, e3), where s′ = s ⊕ e, and the three
substrings e1, e2, and e3 have lengths `1, `2, and `3, respectively (with
` = `1 + `2 + `3).
It is clear that Eve cannot gain any information about s3 from the
verification process, since the only information ever transmitted about s3
(the hash H[s3]) is encrypted by the OTP s1, and s1 is never re-used.
Before proceeding, let us further partition s1 into two strings s1a and
s1b, where s1a is the portion of s1 used to encrypt r, and s1b is the portion
used to encrypt H[s3]. Let `1a and `1b be the lengths of s1a and s1b. We
similarly partition s′1 and e1.
Eve’s only hope of fooling Bob into accepting a tampered-with key
(i.e., accepting even though s′3 6= s3) is for her to choose e1b and e3 such
that the expression H[s3]⊕H[s3⊕e3] = e1b is satisfied. Random guessing
will give her a ∼ 2−`1b chance of tricking Bob into accepting; for Eve to
do better, she must be able to exploit a weakness in the hash function H
that gives her some information as to the correct value of e1b for some
choice of e3. Note that Eve’s best strategy for this attack is to choose e1a
and e2 to be just strings of zeroes.
From this observation, we obtain the following condition on the hash
function: for a random s3 (unknown to Eve), there exists no choice of
e3 such that Eve has any information about the value of e1b she should
choose to satisfy H[s3] ⊕ H[s3 ⊕ e3] = e1b. In practice, it would be ac-
ceptable for Eve to gain a very small amount of information, as long as
the information gained did not raise Eve’s chances much beyond random
guessing. This is a relatively weak requirement on H, and is likely satisfied
by any reasonable choice of hash function.
To fool Alice into falsely accepting, Eve can either fool Bob via the
aforementioned method, or Eve can attempt to impersonate Bob by send-
ing Alice a random string of length `2, in the hopes that it happens to
be equal to s2 ⊕H[r]. Clearly, her chances for the latter method are no
better than 2−`2 . The latter method of attack only fools Alice and not
Bob; it is thus of limited use to Eve.
We note that the security of the verification protocol depends on the
choice of `1 and `2 (as described above); these parameters should be cho-
sen so as to provide whatever degree of security is required. Alice and Bob
choose `3 so as to obtain whatever size key they desire. Since the security
of the verification process does not depend on `3, the communication cost
of key verification is negligible in the limit of large `3 (i.e., in the limit of
large final key size).
4 Security of the Relay Protocol
In order for the secret to be compromised, there must be some j ∈
{1, . . . ,m − 1} such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at least one of vi,j and
vi,j+1 is dishonest (i.e., such that, for some j, every string ri,j is either
sent or received by a compromised party). If this happens, we say the
protocol has been compromised at stage j. For a given j, the probability
of compromise is (1− t2)n, but the probability for j is not entirely inde-
pendent of the probabilities for j−1 and j+ 1. Thus, we can bound from
below the overall probability of the channel between Alice and Bob being
secure, ps, by (1):
ps ≥
[
1− (1− t2)n
]m−1
. (1)
From this result, we see that, if we wish to ensure our probability of
a secure channel between Alice and Bob is at least ps, it is sufficient
to choose n = log
(
1− p1/(m−1)s
)
/ log
(
1− t2). Intercity bandwidth con-
sumed is proportional to n, so we see that we have good scaling of resource
consumption with communication distance. Alternatively, we can re-write
the equation for choosing n in terms of a maximum allowed probability
of compromise, δ = 1− ps. For δ  1, we obtain the following relation:
n ' log (m− 1)− log δ− log (1− t2) .
Total resource usage (intercity communication links required) scales as
O(mn), or O(m logm) for fixed δ, t. While intracity communication re-
quirements scale faster (asO(mn2)), it is reasonable to ignore this because
of the comparatively low cost of intracity communication and the finite
size of the earth (which effectively limits m to a maximum of 100 or so
for a QKD network with single link distances of ∼ 100 km).
If each party in the network simultaneously wished to communicate
with one other party (with that party assumed to be m/2 cities away on
average), total intercity bandwidth would scale as O(m2n2). By compari-
son, the bandwidth for a network of the same number of parties employing
public key cryptography (and no secret sharing) would scale as O(m2n).
Since n scales relatively slowly (i.e., with logm), this is a reasonable
penalty to pay for improved security.
5 Alternative Adversary Models
We now briefly consider a number of alternative adversary models. First,
let us consider replacing adversary capability (iii) with the following al-
ternative, which we term (iii′): the adversary can compromise up to k−1
nodes of its choice. Compromised nodes are assumed to be under the
complete control of the adversary, as before. In this scenario, the security
analysis is trivial. If k > n, the adversary can compromise Alice and Bob’s
communications undetected. Otherwise, Alice and Bob can communicate
securely.
We could also imagine an adversary controls some random subset
of nodes in the network—as described by (iii)—and wishes to disrupt
communications between Alice and Bob (i.e., perform a DOS attack), but
does not have the capability to disrupt or modify public channels. Alice
and Bob can modify the protocol to simultaneously protect against both
this type of attack and also the adversary mentioned in Section 2.1. To do
so, they replace the simple secret sharing scheme described above with a
Proactive Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) scheme [16]. In this scenario,
nodes can check at each stage to see if any shares have been corrupted,
and take corrective measures. This process is robust against up to n/4−1
corrupt shares, which implies that PVSS yields little protection against
DOS attacks unless t > tthresh ≈
√
3/2.
6 Conclusion
We have shown a protocol for solving the relay problem and building se-
cure long-distance communication networks with present-day QKD tech-
nology. The protocol proposed employs secret sharing and multiple paths
through a network of partially-trusted nodes. Through the choice of mod-
erately large n in the relay problem, one can make the possibility of com-
promise vanishingly small. For fixed probability of compromise of each of
the intermediate nodes, the number of nodes per stage required to main-
tain security scales only logarithmically with the number of stages (i.e.,
with distance).
Given that QKD systems are already commercially available, our
methods could be implemented today.
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